CELL PHONES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN FLIGHT: CAN THE FCC AND
FAA MAINTAIN THE BAN?
By: Christopher Dengler

I. Introduction

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) may lift the ban on in-flight cell
phone use.1

If such a barrier falls, this creates an opportunity

to increase business productivity, personal communication, and
general freedom of expression during flights.

Many business

hours are spent traveling for work-related activities.

The lack

of communication with the office negatively impacts productivity;
and no type of travel more obviously impedes business
productivity than air travel because of the long duration and

1

See Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Advisory:

Using Your Wireless Phones on Airplanes, Sept. 23, 2005,
http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cellonplanes.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2005) (stating that the potentially lifting of
the cell phone ban during flight is being explored and is open to
public comment); see also Peter Rojas, FCC Extends Comment Period
on In-Flight Cellphone Ban, Engadget, Apr. 28, 2005,
http://engadget.com/entry/1234000950041666/ (last visited Oct.
14, 2005).
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lack of connectivity with the office when in flight.2

However,

lifting the ban is not unopposed.
When the FCC and the FAA presented their proposal to lift
the ban, both support3 and concern4 quickly surfaced.

2

Moreover,

See Staffan Algers, Johanna Lindqvist Dillen, Transek

Consultancy, Staffan Widlert & The Swedish Institute for
Transportation and Communications Analysis, The National Swedish
Value of Time Study 13 (1994) (stating that a survey showed that
the productivity while traveling aboard a train was approximately
60% of the productivity seen in the office).
3

See Joe Sharkey, Cellphones in Flight: The Story is Data, Not

Chatter, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2004, at C6 (“[T]here is
overwhelming support for changing the rules to allow the use of
wireless communications devices in the air . . . [with silent
communication –] data, not voice . . . .”).
4

See Sara Kehaulani Goo & Keith L. Alexander, In-Flight Calls

Could Cause Turbulence, Opponents Say, Washington Post, Apr. 8,
2005, at E01 (The National Consumers League sponsored a poll that
said “63 percent of Americans don’t want the federal government
to lift its ban on cell phones in flight.”) available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/04/08/AR2005040800564.html.

The

Association of Flight Attendants supports maintaining the
regulations banning cell phone use during flight based on both
continuing technological safety concerns and passenger

2

disruptions.

The Association of Flight Attendants stated that

they were still “concerned with the possibility of random,
unpredictable electromagnetic interference events that could
interfere with an aircraft’s operations.”

Comments of

Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, In the Matter of:
Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Facilitate the Use of
Cellular Telephones and Other Wireless Devices Aboard Airborne
Aircraft, Before the FCC, WT Docket No. 04-435 (May 26, 2005)
(available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-1505/friend.pdf).

However, scientific research, while not yet

conclusive, seems to lead to the conclusion that current cell
phone technology does not interfere with airplane
instrumentation, or current technology – such as pico cells or
forced low-power mode for cell phones used in-flight – exists to
virtually eliminate safety issues.

See Baskar Sridharan & Aditya

P. Mathur, Aircraft Safety in the Presence of Portable Electronic
Devices 2 (Purdue University, Department of Computer Science).
The pico cells are devices that can be used on airplanes as a
“mobile” cell phone node and they could also be used to force the
cell phones on the aircraft into a low power mode where there
should be no interference with either terrestrial communications
or on board sensors.

See Access Intelligence, LLC, Lifting Ban

on Mobile Phone Use in Flight – Do So Carefully Warn
Commentators, Air Safety Week, June 13, 2005,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_2005_June_13/a

3

recent developments galvanized those opposed to lifting the ban.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. is considering marketing adult material
to cell phone Internet users.5

In fact, similar material is

already available to cell phone users in Europe and Asia.6

i_n13831432.

Scientific experiments by airlines offer counter-

examples, showing that a laptop was unable to cause interference
with the aircraft’s communication or navigation.

Id.

Beside

potential technological safety, the Association of Flight
Attendants cite operational disruptions in the cabin – unruly
passengers who fail to follow flight crew instructions – as an
additional reason to continue the ban on cell phone use inflight.

Comments of Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-

CIO, In the Matter of: Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to
Facilitate the Use of Cellular Telephones and Other Wireless
Devices Aboard Airborne Aircraft, Before the FCC, WT Docket No.
04-435 (May 26, 2005) (available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-1505/friend.pdf).
5

In early 2005, Playboy.com made digital pictures available on

electronic handheld devices.

Jay Jay Nesheim, Playboy.com Offers

Stunning Image Galleries for Hand-Held Digital Photo Devices Like
the iPod Photo, Jan. 4, 2005, http://www.playboyenterprises.com/
(follow “News and Media” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
6

Matt Richtel, U.S. Providers Turned off by Porn, Violence via

Cell Phone, The San Diego Union-Tribune, Dec. 27, 2004,

4

Parental rights groups vocally oppose cell phone pornography
because of its accessibility to minors.7

They have lobbied the

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041227/news_mzlb27provi
d.html; see also Cassell Bryan-Low & David Pringle, Sex Cells:
Wireless Operators Find that Racy Cellphone Video Drives Surge in
Broadband, Post-Gazette.com, May 12, 2005, http://www.postgazette.com/pg/05132/503397.stm (finding that erotic content is
available via cell phones in France, Germany, Greece, Portugal,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia).
7

See Cassell Bryan-Low & David Pringle, Sex Cells: Wireless

Operators Find that Racy Cellphone Video Drives Surge in
Broadband, Post-Gazette.com, May 12, 2005, http://www.postgazette.com/pg/05132/503397.stm (“The Mississippi-based American
Family Association sent an ‘action alert’ last month about
Playboy Enterprises Inc.’s plan to offer content for cell phones
[sic] and urged members to ask the FCC to ‘set heavy fines for
pornographers who send their porn to our children’”); see also
James L. Lambert, Former DOJ Prosecutor to Parents: Beware . . .
Cell Phone Porn is on the Horizon, AgapePress, May 13, 2005,
http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/5/132005e.asp (stating
that members from pro-family groups – the American Family
Association, Morality in Media, and the Family Research Council –
met with the FCC to discuss ways to block pornographic material
from being accessed via cell phones); see generally Morality in
the Media, http://www.moralityinmedia.org/ (“[A] national, not-

5

government to promulgate regulations restricting minor’s
accessibility to this material, including maintaining the ban on
cell phone use during flight.8

For example, Morality in Media,

Inc.9 sees this gateway to adult material to be especially
problematic on an airplane because of the close quarters and the
presence of minors.10

for-profit, interfaith organization established in 1962 to combat
obscenity and uphold decency standards in the media.”) (last
visited Nov. 29, 2005).
8

See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2005);

Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2005);
Children’s Internet Protection Act, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2001).
9
10

http://www.moralityinmedia.org
See Access Intelligence, LLC, Lifting Ban on Mobile Phone Use

in Flight – Do So Carefully Warn Commentators, Air Safety Week,
June 13, 2005,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_2005_June_13/a
i_n13831432 (“‘Combining the captive audience of an airplane,
including children, with the ease of passengers to view, send,
and receive indecent and obscene material through the very
technology that the FCC is considering loosening is a dangerous
recipe. This is why if wireless and cellular technologies are
allowed on flights, there must be provisions for banning the use
of such devices for purposes of viewing, sending, or receiving
indecent or profane communications.’ Morality in Media, Inc.”);

6

Appropriate regulatory responses to these concerns need to
consider both constitutional limits and the impact of restricting
the use of cell phones on business productivity.

The possibility

of maintaining the ban on cell phone use during flight raises
First Amendment concerns because any future regulations may have
to rest upon a government interest other than safety.11

see also Evan Hansen, XXX, on a Small Screen Near You, CNET
News.com, Dec. 30, 2004,
http://news.com.com/XXX%2C+on+a+small+screen+near+you/21001039_3-5502413.html (“Porn after the digital revolution is like
sand after a day at the beach: Pretty soon you’re finding it
everywhere – including on the cell phone of the guy one seat over
during that five-hour flight to New York.”).
11

See Marguerite Reardon & Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web,

Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com, Dec. 15, 2004,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html (last visited
Nov. 27, 2005) (stating that a NASA engineer said in a 2000
interview that the airplane cell phone ban would be lifted once
earlier generations of cell phones were no longer in use); see
also Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation
Safety, FAA, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives,
on Cell Phones on Aircraft: Nuisance or Necessity (July 14, 2005)
(transcript available at
http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/Sabatini2.htm) (last visited on

7

This analysis addresses the government’s potential ability
to maintain its current ban on in-flight cell phone use based on
decency and privacy interests if the government determines that
technological safety issues do not continue to preclude their
use.12

The analysis centers on cell phone Internet browsing, as

Nov. 27, 2005) (“This potential to provide passengers with new
communication technologies also raises the issue of what FCC
Commissioner Copps refers to as the ‘annoying-seatmate issue.’ .
. . [I]t’s not hard to imagine a scenario where use of cell
phones by several passengers in the confined space of an aircraft
cabin could lead to conflicts.”).
12

See generally Access Intelligence, LLC, Lifting Ban on Mobile

Phone Use in Flight – Do So Carefully Warn Commentators, Air
Safety Week, June 13, 2005,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_2005_June_13/a
i_n13831432 (summarizing many safety concerns with in-flight cell
phone use, but also quoting aviation and cell phone industry
experts as saying that pico cell technology has the potential, if
properly applied, of eliminating the technological safety issues
of cell phone use during flight); see also Sara Kehaulani Goo &
Keith L. Alexander, In-Flight Calls Could Cause Turbulence,
Opponents Say, Washington Post, Apr. 8, 2005, at E01 (“The FAA is
awaiting results of a study, due in December 2006, on whether the
phones interfere with navigational equipment.”) available at
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opposed to the use of laptops or other personal electronic
devices.

The analysis concludes that the government cannot

justify maintaining a total ban on cell phone use during flight
based purely on decency or privacy concerns.
Part II provides a brief background on the basic right to
speech in settings similar to an airplane.

Part III discusses

possible government justifications for maintaining a ban absent
safety concerns and examines issues of privacy and the ability to
avoid unwanted speech encapsulated in the captive audience
doctrine.

Then Part IV considers the potential applicability of

a time, place, and manner regulation on in-flight cell phone
Internet browsing.

Part V concludes with a discussion of the

extent of permissible regulation in an airplane setting, and what
regulations would constitute a good compromise between competing
interests.

II. Background: A Doctrinal Primer for Cell Phones, Speech, and
Public Transportation

A. Cell Phones are Part of Both Modern Life and Government
Regulation

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/04/08/AR2005040800564.html.

9

The next time you are waiting in an airport for a flight,
stop and take a look around.
cell phones.13

More than 163 million Americans own

Chances are, as an airline passenger, you may

encounter people on their cell phones as they wait for their
flight.

Cell phones and their widespread adoption are recent

developments.14

Today, cell phones are smaller than the palm of

your hand and they allow you to make phone calls from virtually
anywhere, send text messages, take digital pictures, record
video, send email, and browse the Internet.15

13

Jay Cline, Cell Phone Directory Rings True, ComputerWorld,

Sept. 2, 2004,
http://www.computerworld.com/mobiletopics/mobile/story/0,10801,95
650,00.html.
14

Motorola introduced DynaTAC, considered the first mobile

telephone, in 1983.

Christine Rosen, Our Cell Phones, Ourselves,

The New Atlantis, 26, 27 (2004) available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/6/TNA06-CRosen.pdf (“There
were approximately 340,000 wireless subscribers in the United
States in 1985, according to the Cellular Telecommunications and
Internet Associate (CTIA); by 1995, that number had increased to
more than 33 million, and by 2003, more than 158 million people
in the country had gone wireless.”).
15

See Christine Rosen, Our Cell Phones, Ourselves, The New

Atlantis, 26, 30 (2004) available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/6/TNA06-CRosen.pdf; see
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The FCC has regulated cell phones since their inception
while the FAA controls the airlines.

Title 1 of the

Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC power to create
bureaus.16

One of those bureaus is Wireless Telecommunications

Bureaus which “handles nearly all FCC domestic wireless
telecommunications programs, policies, and outreach initiatives.
Wireless communications services include . . . [c]ellular [and
p]ublic [s]afety . . . .”17

The Department of Transportation

created the FAA.18
Together, each of these two agencies banned cell phone use
during flight.

“FCC rules currently ban cell phone use after a

plane has taken off because of potential interference to cellular
phone networks on the ground. In addition, the Federal Aviation

also Despina Afentouli, New Heights for In-Flight Internet,
CNN.com, Mar. 31, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TRAVEL/03/31/bt.internet.flight/ (stating
that German airline carrier Lufthansa installed in-flight
Internet access last May.

The article goes on to explain that

in-flight Internet access “works by sending electronic signals
from planes to orbiting satellites, which are then relayed to
ground stations.”).
16

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2005).

17

See generally http://wireless.fcc.gov (last visited Nov. 27,

2005).
18

49 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
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Administration has rules prohibiting in-flight cell phone use
because of potential interference to navigation and aircraft
systems.”19
in 1991.20

The FCC instituted its ban on airborne cell phone use
While, the FAA currently prohibits the use of cell

phones, wireless communication devices and other portable
electronic devices with radio transmitters (like BlackBerry
handhelds) during flight because of concerns of interference with
aircraft communications and navigation.21

However, the FAA does

allow passengers to use personal electronic devices that do not
have radio transmitters (like portable video games, laptops, and

19

Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Advisory: Using

Your Wireless Phones on Airplanes, Sept. 23, 2005,
http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cellonplanes.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2005).
20

See Comments of Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO,

In the Matter of: Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to
Facilitate the Use of Cellular Telephones and Other Wireless
Devices Aboard Airborne Aircraft, Before the FCC, WT Docket No.
04-435 (May 26, 2005) (available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-1505/friend.pdf).
21

See Subcommittee on Aviation, Hearing on Cell Phones on

Aircraft: Nuisance or Necessity? (July 15, 2005) available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-15-05/07-1505memo.html.
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CD/MP3 players) above 10,000 feet.22

All this regulation is

evidence of how involved the government is in the regulation of
both cell phones and the airlines.

B. State Action

The First Amendment only restricts state action.23

This

means that the First Amendment restricts the government but not
private actors.

The present analysis focuses on government

regulation and not private action by the airlines.

Any action

taking by the private airlines remains to be seen.

This focus is

appropriate because the airline industry is a highly governmentregulated industry where almost any private airline action must
first meet with government approval.

This means that should the

airlines choose to take action on their own, this pervasive
government oversight is important in determining whether the

22

See id.

23

The Constitution prohibits only government from abridging the

rights of free speech.

The First Amendment provides, in relevant

part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”

U.S. Const. amend. I. (emphasis added).

And the

First Amendment applies to the states by virtue of incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
652, 666 (1925).
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Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.

First Amendment also applies to private action by the airlines.24
Given the competitiveness of the airline industry, an analysis of
private regulation by the airlines may end up being moot.

Many

airlines are considering allowing wireless Internet access to
attract business travelers and increase profitability.25

C. Internet Browsing as Speech

Speech protected by the First Amendment is not limited to a
person audibly speaking.

Protected speech includes the written

word as well; books, magazines, newspapers, and writing on a

24

In dicta, previous cases have commented that private action in

highly regulated industries may constitute state action.

“When

authority derives in part from Government’s thumb on the scales,
the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely
akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.”
Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 note 8
(1952) (citations omitted).
25

United Airlines received regulatory approval to be the first

U.S. airline to install Wi-Fi Internet service on its airplanes.
See Roger Yu, Wi-Fi Net Access Could Soon Land on United Flights,
USAToday.com, June 6, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2005-06-06-united-wifi_x.htm.

“United hopes the service will generate profit and

attract more passengers.” Id.

14

jacket are speech potentially protected by the First Amendment.26
The Internet is a medium where both written and audible speech is
available to anyone with an electronic device capable of
accessing it.

This ability to access such material – e.g.

browsing the Internet – is closely tied to the First Amendment’s
protection of speech.27

In a case involving a school board’s

decision to remove particular books from the library, a plurality
found that the right to receive information is an “inherent
corollary” of the First Amendment.28

These Justices also said

“the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas.”29

This close constitutional correlation between a

person’s right to speak and another person’s right to hear that

26

See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding

that writing on a jacket is speech for First Amendment
considerations).
27

See Glenn Kubota, Public School Usage of Internet Filtering

Software: Book Banning Reincarnated?, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 687,
708-09 (1997).
28

See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he

right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the
recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech . . .
.”) (plurality opinion).
29

See id. at 867 (plurality opinion) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia,

394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).

15

speech is why Internet browsing falls under the First Amendment’s
protection of speech.30
An example of Internet browsing of speech is evident in
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc.31.
specifically used a free speech analysis.

The Court
In this case the

constitutionality of a library’s decision to use Internet filter
software on their publicly accessible computers was challenged.32
The Court analyzed the library’s Internet access using a freedom
of speech analysis and held that “Internet access in public
libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘designated’ public
forum.”33

D. Free Speech and Public Transportation

30

See id. at 867 (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish

nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive
and consider them.

It would be a barren marketplace of ideas

that had only sellers and no buyers.”) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(BRENNAN, J., concurring)).
31

539 U.S. 194 (2003).

32

See generally United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539

U.S. 194 (2003).
33

Id. at 205 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund,

Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
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The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”34

While this text put restraints upon

the government’s ability to restrict speech, the Supreme Court
does not interpret this provision as barring all regulation of
speech.35

The Supreme Court allows great protection for certain

categories of speech and specifies that other categories of
speech, such as obscene speech, fall outside of the safeguards of
the First Amendment.36

However, even indecent speech receives

First Amendment protection.37

“[T]he government may not prohibit

34

U.S. Const. amend. I.

35

See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483-85 (1957) (“[T]he

unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to
protect every utterance. . . . There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”) (citation omitted).
36

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene

material is unprotected by the First Amendment”); see also Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
37

See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,

811 (2000) (stating that even sexual explicit, but not obscene,
material receives First Amendment protection).
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or punish speech simply because others might find it offensive,”38
but the government may regulate it.
Freedom to engage in expressive activity in all forms on
public transportation is not a given.

And neither is a total ban

on expressive activity in a public transportation setting
obviously in accordance with the protections of the First
Amendment.

The degree of permissible expressive activity, or its

regulation, on public transportation involves an analysis of (i)
the power of Congress to regulate the activity, (ii) the type of
forum, and (iii) whether the regulation is appropriate given the
type of forum.

1. Congressional Power to Regulate

Congress’s power to regulate any activity, including
expressive activity, dealing with the functioning of public
transportation would likely rest on the Commerce Clause.39

The

Court’s current interpretation of the Commerce Clause is broad.
The Commerce Clause allows the federal government to regulate not
only the transportation of interstate goods, but also any

38

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies

999 (Aspen Law & Business 2002).
39

“Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . .

among the several States. . . .”

18

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

intrastate activity that has an effect on those interstate
goods.40
Interstate public transportation is subject to federal
regulation.

And airlines are the prototypical example of

interstate public transportation because the majority of airline
passengers travel from one state to another.

Other major forms

of public transportation – trains, automobiles, and buses – may
not have a similarly high percentage of interstate travel as
airplanes, but because of the broad constitutional interpretation
of the Commerce Clause and the effect that intrastate public
transportation has on interstate commerce, there is little issue
with the federal government’s power to pass regulations
concerning public transportation.

2. The Public Transportation Forum

The next step in a general free speech on public
transportation analysis by the courts is determining the type of
forum of the location.

The Court has identified three types of

fora – the traditional public forum, the government-designated

40

See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241

(1964); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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forum, and the nonpublic forum.41

Traditional public fora are

typically public streets and parks; the places which “by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate.”42

In contrast to traditional public fora, which by their

very nature are open to speech, the government can also designate
a place for use by the public for assembly and speech.43

A

government-designated forum is one that is open for use by
certain speakers or for certain subjects.44

Importantly though,

“[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”45

The Court

looks at the policy and practice of the government regarding the

41

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 802 (1985); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983).
42

See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.

37, 45 (1983).
43

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 802 (1985).
44

See id.

An example of a government-designated public forum is

an outdoor concert theater for music.

The government could limit

the speakers and subject to music only, banning political or
religious speakers from using the theater.
45

Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,

460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
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location in question or the nature of the property and its
compatibility with the expressive activity o determine whether
the government created a forum.46
In Leman v. City of Shaker Heights47 the Court addressed
speech on city transit buses.

Leman concerned the city denying a

politician access to advertising space on the city’s buses even
though there was space available.48

The city had denied

advertising to politicians for 26 years.49

But the Court did not

see this as a violation of the First Amendment because the
advertising space on the bus was not a public forum.

The Court

found that the city’s use of the property as a commercial
enterprise, i.e. raising revenue dollars through advertising, was
inconsistent with an intent to designate that space on the city
buses as a public forum.50

This holding agreed with the Supreme

46

Id.

47

418 U.S. 298 (1974).

48

See generally Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298

(1974).
49

See id. at 299-300.

50

See id. at 303; cf. Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.

451 (1952) (applying the First and Fifth Amendments to a private
company operating a street railway and bus system in the District
of Columbia and piping music, announcements, and commercial
advertising over a speaker system in the cars.

However, the

Court did not directly classify the forum of the railcars or

21

Court of Ohio’s holding in the case which concluded that “the
constitutionally protected right of free speech with respect to
forums for oral speech, or the dissemination of literature on a
city’s street, does not extend to commercial or political
advertising on rapid transit vehicles.”51
The Court has been reluctant to expand traditional public
fora beyond streets and public parks, often due to the historical
or time component needed to establish something as a public
forum.52

Following this rationale and the cases above, the courts

would likely conclude that an airplane is not a traditional
public forum.

Therefore, airplanes are either a government-

designated forum or, more likely, a nonpublic forum and are then
potentially subject to greater government regulation of speech.

buses, but in applying Constitutional limitations it suggests
that the Court viewed the forum as either a public forum or a
designated forum.).
51

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301 (1974)

(citing 296 N.E.2d 683 (1973)) (emphasis added).
52

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 817 (1985); see also Haque v. Comm. for Idus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939) (stating that traditional public fora are those
that "time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions").
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3. Constitutional Regulations Given the Forum

Upon determining the type of forum, it is necessary to
address whether the government regulation is constitutional
according to the appropriate forum-specific test.53

Since an

airplane is not a traditional public forum, the two potentially
relevant analyses are those for a government-designated forum and
a nonpublic forum.
In a government-designated forum it is necessary for a
regulation to be content-neutral54 and for the government to have
a compelling interest.55

Whereas “[a]ccess to a nonpublic forum .

. . can be restricted as long as the restrictions are reasonable
and [are] not an effort to suppress expression . . . .”56

53

In a

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 800 (1985) (“[T]he extent to which the Government can
control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.”).
54

See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).

There is are exceptions to content-neutrality in such areas as
obscenity, child pornography, fighting words, and secondary
effects associated with adult businesses; however, for speech
that is fully protected by the First Amendment, the regulations
must be content-neutral.
55

Id.

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 800 (1985).
56

See id.
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case involving a First Amendment challenge to a ban of
solicitations within airport terminals, the Court held that the
airport terminal was a nonpublic forum.57

As a nonpublic forum, a

government regulation would only have to satisfy a requirement of
reasonableness.58
Beyond the forum, an analysis of the constitutionality of
the government’s ban on cell phone use during flight requires the
consideration of several additional factors.

One factor is the

applicable case law concerning the location – an enclosed area
with relatively limited ability to relocate - which may create
conflicts with unwilling listeners or minors.
addressed by the captive audience doctrine.

This issue is
Another factor is

the type of government regulation – i.e. whether it is a contentneutral time, place, and manner regulation or a reasonable
regulation of a nonpublic forum.

57

See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505

U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992) (holding that airports are a nonpublic
forum because they have not been held out for expressive activity
“immemorially . . . time out of mind,”

and that the continued

litigation concerning expressive activity in airports evidences
operators’ objections countering assertions of a designated
forum).
58

See id. (“The restriction need only be reasonable; it need not

be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.”)
(citation omitted).
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III. The Collision Between a Captive Audience and Free Speech
Rights

This section addresses three topics: (i) whether someone
accessing the Internet on a cell phone in an enclosed area, like
an airplane, falls under what the Court calls the captive
audience doctrine, (ii) how the Court balances privacy and
speech, and (iii) the considerations of the Court when minors are
part of the audience.

A. What Makes an Audience Captive?

Traditionally, captive audience doctrine applies to a
situation where the listener has no choice but to hear (or see,
in the case of visual speech) the undesired speech.59

A captive

audience may allow the government greater latitude in regulating
the speech within constitutional boundaries.

59

The factors

See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); cf.

Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (using, for the first time, the term “captive
audience,” in this case referring to an audience on a public
street involuntarily listening to a minister); see also Close v.
Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 991 (1st Cir. 1970) (“Freedom of speech
must recognize, at least within limits, freedom not to listen.”).
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considered in finding an audience to be captive are: (i) the
location of the speech - containing a strong spatial component,60
(ii) the intrusiveness of the speech – often based on how loud or
how visible,61 and (iii) the ability or effort required by an
unwilling listener to avoid the speech.62
The general purpose of the captive audience doctrine is to
ensure that “free speech rights do not stand as an absolute bar
to government’s discretion to decide to favor the unwilling

60

See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04

(1952) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring).
61

See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11, n.

6 (1975) (“[I]t may not be the content of the speech, as much as
the deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault,’ that justifies
proscription.”) (citation and brackets omitted); see also Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1952) (Blackmun,
J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring).
62

See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000)

“[T]he

protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace
offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience
cannot avoid it.”
487 (1988)).

Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,

See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21

(1971) (recognizing that using a right to privacy to allow
regulation of speech that is easily avoidable, like writing on a
jacket, is not constitutional).

26

listener over the unpleasant speaker.”63

The Supreme Court has

said “we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.”64
However, under the Court’s captive audience doctrine, certain
factors temper the government’s discretion to “favor the
unwilling listener” by regulating the speech through contentbased or time, place, or manner regulations.65
One such factor is location.

The Supreme Court’s

interpretation of the First Amendment gives the government
greater ability to protect people in their homes from intrusive
speech.

The Court has said, “surely [the interest of being free

from unwanted expression in public] is nothing like the interest
in being free from unwanted expression in the confines of one’s
own home.”66

However, this location/spatial factor is not the

only consideration in finding a captive audience.

While the

spatial factor is part of the Court’s consideration in finding a
captive audience, another factor to focus on, especially in

63

William D. Araiza, Captive Audiences, Children and the

Internet, 41 Brandeis L.J. 397, 404 (2003) (emphasis added).
64

Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).

65

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[T]he mere

presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not
serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of
giving offense”) (citation omitted).
66

Id. at 21-22.
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situations outside the home, is the listener’s ability to avoid
the unwanted speech.67

1. Location, Location, Location: The Spatial Factor of
the Captive Audience Doctrine

The Supreme Court first applied the captive audience
doctrine in cases involving speech intruding upon an unwilling
listener’s home.

This led some commentators to conclude that the

captive audience doctrine is essentially one focused on a home
setting.68

The typical example of a captive audience is one who

is the subject of intrusive speech at his residence – such as
residential picketing69 or mail.70

67

However, courts recognize that

See generally id. (holding that unwilling audience could avert

their eyes from the writing on jacket).
68

See Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19

Hastings Const. L.Q. 85, 90 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 845 (Aspen Law &
Business 2002).
69

See generally Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding

a narrow reading of a state law banning picketing in residential
neighborhoods to protect those who were presumptively unwilling
to receive such speech); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,
512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding the part of an injunction
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a captive audience can exist outside the home.

For example,

courts have applied the doctrine in cases involving bus
advertisements71 and radio communication in a streetcar.72

restricting the audible speech of protesters that recovering
patients could not reasonably avoid).
70

Cf. Bolger v. Young’s Drug Products Co., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)

(finding unconstitutional a federal law that prevented the
unsolicited mailing of contraceptive information because
“[r]ecipients of objectionable mailings . . . may effectively
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities [through a] . .
. journey from mail box to trash can”) (internal quotation
omitted) (citations omitted), and Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (holding that a mailer’s
right to communicate had to stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive
addressee because “[t]o hold less would tend to license a form of
trespass and would make hardly more sense than to say that a
radio or television viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an
offensive or boring communication and thus bar its entering his
home”).
71

See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).

72

See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (stating

that passengers of city streetcars and buses had to get to work,
often had no other alternatives to public transportation, and
could not ignore the speech and therefore were captive audiences)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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During the infancy of the captive audience doctrine there
was no concept of the spatial factor that is so important in
today’s application of the doctrine.

Justice Jackson’s dissent

in Kuntz v. New York73 first used the term captive audience.

The

majority of the Court did not apply the captive audience doctrine
to Kuntz because the case involved a minister speaking on a
public street.74

The Court has been reluctant to apply the

captive audience doctrine to publicly accessible places.75

In

another early, Wolin v. Port of New York Authority,76 the first
outline of the spatial factor beginning to develop.

Wolin

involved speech in a bus terminal and succinctly summarizes when
restrictions on speech may be permissible in a public but
enclosed setting:

73

340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951).

74

Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J.,

dissenting).
75

See Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (1968)

(finding that a transit station did not constitute a captive
audience just because it had a roof, but was architecturally
similar to a public street that happened to be underground);
Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (stating
that music transmitted in buses and streetcars did not infringe
on the First Amendment rights of the passengers).
76

392 F.2d 83 (1968).
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[W]here the issue involves the exercise of First
Amendment rights in a place clearly available to the
general public, the inquiry must go further: does the
character of the place, the pattern of usual activity,
the nature of its essential purpose and the population
who take advantage of the general invitation extended,
make it an appropriate place for communication.77

The use of the spatial factor in Wolin to determine if
there is a captive audience is evident - “the enclosed design of
the forum will affect the degree of restriction on communication
tolerable under the Constitution.”78

While this spatial component

is one factor in a captive audience analysis, another
consideration is how easily the unwilling listener – who is
perhaps spatially close – can avoid the speech.79

2. Avoidability: The Intrusiveness of the Speech and
the Captive’s Opportunity to Avoid it

77

Id. at 89.

78

Id. at 93.

79

See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04

(1952) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(recognizing the tension between the right of a person to speak
and the rights of an unwilling listener not to be “forced” to
listen).
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The failure to find a captive audience usually arises
because of the listener’s ability to avoid the unwanted speech.80
There are two interrelated factors in evaluating the avoidability
of the speech – the intrusiveness of the speech and the effort
involved by the potential “captive” to avoid the speech.81
Because speech comes in many forms, it can be unavoidable
in a variety of ways.

For example, speech can be intrusive and

potentially unavoidable because of the volume or the size of the
visual aid the speaker uses.

In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,

Inc.,82 one of the issues was the volume of the protestors outside
a women’s health clinic.83

In that case the Court upheld a noise

injunction against picketers outside a clinic reasoning that

80

See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73

(1994) (upholding the part of the injunction restricting the
audible speech of protesters but striking down the part of the
injunction restricting the use of “images observable” because of
the ease with which patients could avoid them, by closing the
blinds).
81

See id.

82

512 U.S. 753 (1994).

83

See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 759-60

(1994).
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recovering patients could not avoid speech at high volumes.84
Because of this unavoidability the Court upheld the injunction of
the volume of the protestors.85
The Court seems more likely to deem that audible speech is
unavoidable while potentially intrusive visible speech is not
unavoidable.86

For example, in one case the Court held that a

drive-in theater screen visible to the public was not
unavoidable.87

This is just one example very visible speech still

being avoidable.

84

See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73

(1994) (upholding the part of an injunction restricting the
audible speech of protesters that recovering patients could not
reasonably avoid.

“The First Amendment does not demand that

patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to
escape the cacophony of political protests.

‘If overamplified

loud-speakers assault the citizenry, government may turn them
down.’”) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972)).
85

See id.

86

See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773

(1994) (“[I]t is much easier for the [unwilling listener] to pull
[the] curtains [to avoid visible speech] than for the [unwilling
listener] to stop up her ears . . .”).
87

In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the

government tried to defend a city ordinance making the exhibition
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Along with unavoidability, the Court analyzes the effort
required to avoid the unwanted speech before holding that an
audience is captive.

The best example of the analysis of the

effort to avoid speech appears in Erznoznik.88

Erznoznik involved

the prosecution of a drive-in movie theatre and its operator.89
Under a Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance, the exhibition of films
containing nudity was a punishable offense as a public nuisance
if the screen was visible from a public street or place outside
the property.90

The Court looked at both how “obtrusive” the

speech, in this case the movie theatre screen, was and how easily
viewers could avoid the speech.91

The Court found that even a

of “any motion picture . . . in which the human male or female
bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic
areas are shown” by a drive-in movies theater visible from public
streets or public places a public nuisance, Id. at 207, based on
“protect[ing] its citizens against unwilling exposure to
materials that may be offensive.”

Id. at 208.

However, the

Court held that “the screen of a drive-in theater is not ‘so
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to
avoid exposure to it.’”

Id. at 212 (quoting Redrup v. New York,

386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)) (emphasis added).
88

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

89

See id.

90

See generally id.

91

See id. at 208-12.
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drive-in movie theater screen was not “so obtrusive as to make it
impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.”92
The burden normally falls on the unwitting viewer to avoid
exposure, where practicable, by “simply by averting [his] eyes.”93
The Court applied the reasoning in Erznoznik to more
enclosed settings.

In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, both the

plurality and concurring opinions recognized that the degree of
captivity and the resultant intrusion on privacy is significantly

92

See id. at 212 (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769

(1967)); but see Cactus Corp. v. State of Arizona, 480 P.2d 375,
379 (1971) (“A drive-in theatre is capable of imposing its
pictures upon persons without their consent . . . . [W]e conceive
of no reason why [the drive-in theatre] cannot be prohibited from
polluting the neighborhood with visual material harmful to
children.”).
93

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); see Erznoznik v.

City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975); see also Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (“[I]n many locations, [the
Supreme Court] expects individuals simply to avoid speech they do
not want to hear”) (citation omitted); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (stating that unwanted
mail is easily avoided by merely throwing it out); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530,
542 (1980).
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greater for a passenger on a bus than for a person on the
street.94

3. Application of the Captive Audience Doctrine to
Cell Phone Internet Access in an Airplane

If the unwilling listener on the airplane is captive, then
this gives the government greater justification in imposing
regulations on speakers.95

A captive audience might justify the

government in maintaining the ban on cell phones in-flight.
However, this is a superficial application of the captive
audience doctrine.

Even given that an airplane is close quarters

and that a passenger is definitely captive in the sense that he
cannot just get up and leave, this does not assure a finding of a
captive audience.

Because unwilling listeners can easily avoid

cell phone Internet browsing, the captive audience doctrine does
not apply.

94

Even one of the largest cell phones only has a screen

See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04

(1952) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring).
95

See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)

(stating that selective restrictions of speech can be upheld if
the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling
viewer to avoid exposure (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1952))).
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that is approximately 2.5 inches wide by 2.71 inches high.96
These screens are not exactly as large as a drive-in theatre
screen, where the Court did not find the visual speech
unavoidable.97

To get an accurate idea of images on such a small

screen would require effort seeking out that speech.

The effort

to avoid such visual cell phone speech, even in close quarters,
is practically nil.98

Since this visual cell phone speech, even

if unwanted, and even if in close quarters where one cannot leave
or relocate, is so easily avoided, it is unlikely that a
passenger is captive under these particular facts.99

96

Cingular Wireless sells a BlackBerry 7100g, one of the mobile

devices with the largest screen – 240 x 260 pixels (2.5 x 2.71
inches.

Cingular Wireless, Online Store,

http://onlinestorez.cingular.com/cell-phone-service/cellphones/cell-phones.jsp?source=INC230063&_requestid=94064 (enter
zip code when prompt; then scroll down to BlackBerry 7100g) (last
visited Dec. 2, 2005).
97

See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

98

See id. at 221 (“In the case of newspapers and magazines, there

must be some seeking by the one who is to see”) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
99

Passengers can avoid written advertisements, as opposed to

auditory speech, by simply not looking at them and therefore any
“captive” audience considerations should yield to First Amendment
rights.

Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 320-21
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However, this reasoning becomes more strained the larger
the visible screen becomes, like with, for example, laptops or
portable DVD players.

Portable DVD players have screens that can

be as large as 9 inches diagonally and laptop computers can have
screens as large as 19 inches diagonally.

Even with these larger

visible areas, they are still avoidable by the unwilling viewer.
For example, in a case involving male firefighters looking at a
Playboy magazine in the firehouse in the presence of female
firefighters the court found that the unwilling viewers were not
a captive audience because they could easily avert their eyes.100

(1952) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Also the Court has drawn a

distinction between newspapers and periodicals, which are easily
avoided, and are even more observable by a surrounding audience
than visual images on a cell phone, and billboards or streetcar
signs which are not as easily avoided by an unwilling listener.
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974)
(referencing Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932)).
Applying this logic to passengers on an airplane, it is difficult
to rationalize applying the captive audience doctrine to visual
images on a cell phone, regardless of the spatial setting because
the images are so easily avoided by an unwilling viewer.
100

See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Department, 1994

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8270, 24, note 6 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
“[i]ndividuals who may avoid material by averting their eyes are
not a ‘captive audience’”).
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The situation is slightly more complicated if the cell
phone use constitutes audible speech.

Audible speech is much

harder to avoid than visual speech,101 and it is therefore more
likely that a passenger is a captive audience.102

However, the

largest challenge for the government is distinguishing audible
cell phone use from conversations between passengers or
announcements from the captain over the airplane’s speakers.103

101

See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994)

(upholding the part of an injunction prohibiting picketers from
making excessive noise outside an abortion clinic based in part
that patients were a captive audience and the speech was not
easily avoided, but striking down the part of the injunction that
prohibited observable messages because that speech is easily
avoided by closing the blinds).
102

See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).

103

See Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468

(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“One who is in a public vehicle
may not of course complain of the noise of the crowd and the
babble of tongues.

One who enters any public place sacrifices

some of his privacy”).

The degree of interference caused by the

unwanted speech should be considered.

If the speech does not

interfere with the business or privacy expectations of the
customers, then the speech should not be proscribed.

See

generally In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353 (1967).
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When the FCC and FAA instituted the ban on cell phone use
during flight in was because of safety, which is a weighty
government interest.104

However, once this brick is removed from

the scales, the balancing of First Amendment freedom of speech
rights and constitutionally allowable regulation of such speech
is much more difficult.

The captive audience doctrine could

provide the government with more weight on the side of the scale
favoring regulation.
However, in light of the analysis above, it seems unlikely
that the Court would apply the captive audience doctrine to
audible cell phone speech because it is virtually
indistinguishable, constitutionally, from conversations between
passengers.105

Additionally, unwilling passengers subjected to

104

See supra note 13.

105

There are differences between a conversation between two

passengers – an airplane conversation - and a conversation
between one passenger and someone on the ground via a cell phone
– an in-flight cell phone conversation.

However, it seems that

there might be greater reasons for protecting an in-flight cell
phone conversation rather than an airplane conversation.
First, during an airplane conversation both speaker and listener
are in the same physical location so they expect their speech to
be subject to the same restrictions.

But with an in-flight cell

phone conversation any restrictions placed on the airline
passenger are “felt” by the person on the ground.
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So if the

visual cell phone use are even less likely to qualify as a
captive audience due to the ease with which they can avert their
eyes.

Importantly, the government currently does not regulate

the use of laptops, magazines, or portable DVD players during
flight, which are harder to avoid than cell phones because of
their larger displays.

Since laptops, magazines, and portable

DVD players do not pose a safety concern because they do not
transmit radio signals, the government has not imposed an inflight ban.106

In would seem incongruous to try to use the

government restricts passengers from using the word bomb in any
context, this will affect the person on the ground’s ability to
hear any speech containing that word even though that person is
not on an airplane and the same safety concerns do not apply to
that person.
Second, a third party who is unwillingly listening to the
conversation is forced to avoid twice as much speech in an
airplane conversation as opposed to an in-flight cell phone
conversation where only one side of the conversation is
discernable.
On first blush it seems that there is more justification for
regulating an airplane conversation than there is for regulating
an in-flight cell phone conversation when technological safety is
not the issue.
106

See Subcommittee on Aviation, Hearing on Cell Phones on

Aircraft: Nuisance or Necessity? (July 15, 2005) available at
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captive audience doctrine to justify a government-imposed
regulation on cell phone use in-flight when there is not similar
regulations for non-transmitting laptops, magazines, or portable
DVD players.107

B. Privacy (and Personal Autonomy) . . . Outside the Home?

Another, not altogether separate, factor in cases involving
unwilling listeners is the listener’s right to privacy.

The

right to privacy involves personal autonomy and the right not to

http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-15-05/07-1505memo.html.
107

The incongruity exists because laptops, magazines, and

portable DVD players are as capable of displaying – either
audibly or visually – indecent or offensive material as a cell
phone with Internet capability.

The government may try and

justify the continuation of the in-flight cell phone ban based on
protecting minors or other captive audience members from indecent
or offensive speech.

However, if the government has not imposed

the same indecency restrictions on laptops, magazines, or
portable DVD players then the statute is unconstitutionally
under-inclusive.

A ban on cell phone use during flight justified

by indecency concerns is under-inclusiveness because it fails to
address the potential indecency seen on laptops and portable DVD
players.
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be forced to listen to unwanted speech.108
rights risk impeding upon free speech.

Recognition of such

Therefore a certain

balancing between the privacy rights and free speech rights must
be done.109

In considering this “intersection between the . . .

protection of . . . privacy and the First Amendment’s protection
of an individual’s right to receive, and consider, information

108

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (“[T]he

individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases . . . is .
. . fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty”); see also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 652 (2003) (“[T]here are . . .
spheres of a person’s lives and existence, outside the home,
where the State should not be a dominant presence.
extends beyond spatial bounds.

Freedom

Liberty presumes an autonomy of

self.”).
109

See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (“The

dissenters . . . appear to consider recognizing any of the
interest of unwilling listeners – let alone balancing those
interests against the rights of speakers – to be
unconstitutional.

Our cases do not support this view.”); see

also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975)
(stating that the Court “has considered analogous issues –
pitting the First Amendment rights of speakers against the
privacy rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors
– in a variety of contexts.

Such cases demand delicate

balancing.”) (citations omitted).
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and ideas,”110 the Court is very protective of the unwilling
listener in their home.111

However, regulations favoring an

unwilling listener over a person exercising free speech outside
the home are less likely to be held constitutional.112
“The recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted
communication varies widely in different settings.”113

In

locations accessible to more people it is important to remember
that “[o]ne who is in a public vehicle may not of course complain

110

United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d

578, 589 (2005).
111

See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988); see also

Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736
(1970) (“[T]he right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be
placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate.”).
112

See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519

U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding a fixed 15 foot buffer zone around the
clinic’s entrances where abortion demonstrators were prohibited,
but striking down a floating 15 foot no-protest buffer zone
around a person or vehicle seeking access or leaving the clinic);
cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding a statute
providing an eight foot buffer zone around people entering a
health care facility as a valid restriction on speech, serving a
significant governmental interest).
113

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000).
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of the noise of the crowd and the babble of tongues.

One who

enters any public place sacrifices some of his privacy.”114

C. Minors as Part of the Captured

The above discussion of the application of the captive
audience doctrine did not thoroughly address the additional
complications posed by minors in the audience.
introduce unique considerations.

Minors often

The Court has found that

children can be treated differently than adults across a broad
range of areas – such as marriage, voting, military service, and
drinking to name a few.
There are many cases discussing captive audience generally,
but none make specific references to minors being part of the
captured.

However, in Ginsberg115 Justice Stewart’s concurrence

stated that the “free trade of ideas” required that listeners
have the ability to choose what to listen to.116

Such choice

depends on the ability to avoid or tune out the unwanted speech
according to Justice Stewart.

114

He then compared a minor to a

Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952)

(Douglas, J., dissenting).
115

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).

116

See id. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Abrams v.

United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
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captive audience in that both lacked this choice, one because of
captivity and the other because of immaturity.117
Then there are cases that discuss the issues of free speech
that impact minors.

Access to the Internet by minors, due to its

rapid adoption by youth and massive amount of information –
educational, entertaining, useful, offensive, and even obscene –
that is accessible, and the associated regulation is
constitutionally difficult.118
The important aspect of these cases as they pertain to the
use of cell phones during flight is in determining the relative
weight of the government interest for supporting the ban if
minors are on the plane.

The Court has found a constitutional

right for parents to control what their children see.119

But it

is unclear whether this right would extend so far as to support a

117

See id. at 639.

118

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234

(2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also United States
v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (holding that the
installation of Internet filters removable upon the request of
patrons did not violate the First Amendment).
119

See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society

of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also, e.g., Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (holding that Amish parents could not be compelled to send
their children to a certain level of schooling).
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ban on cell phones but still allow the use of laptops, magazines
and portable DVD players – all of which could pose the same
concerns of indecency.

IV. Regulating Cell Phone Internet Access Through Time, Place,
and Manner Restrictions: Can the Government Make You Hang Up?

No forum for speech is without boundaries or regulation.120
“[P]rotected speech is not equally permissible in all places and
at all times . . . without regard to the nature of the property
or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s
activities.”121

For example, time, place, and manner regulations

are a way to make speech orderly and understandable without
suppressing ideas, no matter how unpopular.

Such regulations

must be (i) content-neutral, (ii) narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and (iii) leaves open ample
alternative channels for communication.122

120

However, the strict

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473

U.S. 788, 799 (1985) (“Even protected speech is not equally
permissible in all places and at all times.”).
121

Id. at 799-800.

122

Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,

293 (1984); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (explaining that a regulation on free expression may be
upheld if it furthers a substantial government interest, is
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scrutiny of this doctrine is only applicable to an airplane if a
court determines that an airplane is a government-designated
forum.

Otherwise, for a nonpublic forum the government

regulation only has to be reasonable – i.e. not requiring narrow
tailoring or leaving open ample alternative channels for
communication.

However, even in a nonpublic forum regulations

must be viewpoint neutral.123

A.

Content and Viewpoint Neutrality

“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality,
in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.

The

content-neutral, and narrowly tailored); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
123

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473

U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“Control over access to a nonpublic forum
can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as
the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”) (citing Perry
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49
(1983)).

48

government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.”124

The

current ban on in-flight cell phone use is content neutral.125
The ban makes no reference as to the content of the speech, but
rather bans a particular mode of communication - the manner when the airplane’s – the place - doors close - the time.

The

Court has upheld bans that “distinguish[ed] between speakers . .
. based only upon the manner in which [the] speakers
transmit[ted] their messages to viewers, and not upon the
messages they carr[ied].”126
While captive audience doctrine and privacy considerations
may not justify government restrictions, the government may still
try to regulate in-flight cell phone use by relying on the
reasoning in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.127

In Ward, New York

city officials attempted to regulate the volume of amplified
music.

The Court held that this was a valid exercise of a

content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction because the
government had a strong interest in protecting the privacy of

124

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

125

See supra note 13.

The bans are on all radio transmission

devices during flight and in no way refer to the content;
therefore the current regulations banning cell phone use inflight are content-neutral.
126

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645

(1994).
127

491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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those living in homes nearby.

The city could “act to protect

even such traditional public forums as city streets and parks
from excessive noise.”128

By extension, the government could

argue that there is an interest in maintaining a reasonable
volume in an enclosed area like an airplane, especially
considering that one cannot just get up and leave.

This may

support a volume regulation of cell phone Internet usage, or the
requirement to use headphones, but Ward did not contain a total
ban.

Therefore Ward is not helpful to support maintaining a

total ban for the benefit of noise reduction.

B.

Regulation Advancing a Government Interest

This element is much more variable and dependent upon a
variety of fact-driven considerations.

Factors include: “the

nature of the speech activity being regulated; the perceived
significance of the governmental interest; the scope of the
restriction; the availability of effective, but less restrictive
alternatives; and the court’s judgment as to the actual
effectiveness of the restriction in advancing the proffered
interest.”129

128

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (citing

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949)).
129
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In determining the nature of the speech activity, the Court
is much more sympathetic to claimed violations of First Amendment
rights when the mode of communication is more traditional.130

In

Watchtower,131 the Court began by noting that the speech at issue
was highly valued and had “historical importance . . . for the
dissemination ideas.”132

While cell phone use, especially for

Internet browsing, lacks the important historical aspect that the
Court looks for in important speech activities and forums,133 it
does represent an increasingly important mode of communication in
modern life.
Cases finding that particular speech activities are
important vary.

130

Speaking to people by displaying a sign in one’s

See Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v.

Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (striking down an
ordinance requiring a permit to engage in door-to-door
solicitations or neighborhood canvassing); City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking down a city ordinance
prohibiting homeowners from display signs on their property
unless they fell under particular exemptions).
131

Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v.

Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
132

Id. at 162.

133

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473

U.S. 788, 802 (1985).

51

front yard is an important speech activity.134

Demonstrating

dissatisfaction through protest and picketing is an important
speech activity.135

Reading newspapers, magazines, or other

periodicals is an important speech activity.
The Internet is a virtual public square where similar such
activities take place electronically.

One can enter this virtual

square, through a computer or cell phone, and choose to read a
particular electronic newspaper, blog,136 or personal webpage.
All these forms of communication in their more traditional
format, whether it is in books, signs, or speeches on the street
corner, are protected as important speech activities.

It seems

difficult to see how the right to speak or listen is changed by
the fact that the speech now exists in an electronic format,
unless the government has a reasonable interest particular to
this electronic mode of communication.

134

See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).

135

See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); see also Madsen v.

Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
136

A blog is the common term used for a web-log, which is an

electronic diary where a person posts their thoughts, ideas, or
pictures in a relatively unformatted, almost stream of
consciousness, fashion.
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=blog.
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Traditionally, the government interest in restricting
access to such electronic speech through the use of cell phones
during an airplane flight was significant – public safety and
reliable communication.

The FCC’s primary concern is “possible

disruption of cell phone communication on the ground.”137

The

FAA’s worry is that “cell phones might interfere with a plane’s
navigation and electrical systems.”138

NASA noted at least four

years ago that cell phones are being designed such that “they
emitted remarkably fewer interference-causing spurious radio

137

Marguerite Reardon and Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web,

Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com Dec. 15, 2004, available at
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html; see also David
Armstrong, Airlines Could Allow Chatter FCC Reconsidering Ban on
In-Flight Calls, Starting to Ask Travelers What They Think, San
Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 28, 2005, Page C-1, available at
http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/04/28/BUGECCBEKN61.DTL&type=business
138

Marguerite Reardon and Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web,

Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com Dec. 15, 2004, available at
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html; see also David
Armstrong, Airlines Could Allow Chatter FCC Reconsidering Ban on
In-Flight Calls, Starting to Ask Travelers What They Think, San
Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 28, 2005, Page C-1, available at
http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/04/28/BUGECCBEKN61.DTL&type=business
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signals.”139

If technological improvements and scientific studies

demonstrate that using cell phones during flight is safe, then
the government would need to put forth another interest to
justify a ban.

The substantial interests that the government is

likely to use to try and justify maintaining a ban would be (i)
protecting the privacy/comfort of a captive audience, (ii)
protect unwilling listeners, especially children, from being
subjected to offensive and potentially indecent speech or (iii)
because such use may increase passenger-flight attendant
confrontations.
Protecting an adult audience from potentially offensive
cell phone Internet speech in an airplane based on the fact that
they are a captive audience cannot be sustained.140

However, it

is a closer call whether protecting minors from potentially
offensive cell phone Internet speech in an enclosed setting is a
reasonable government interest.
articulate a clear rule.

139

The Court has failed to

Some cases have held that the

Marguerite Reardon and Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web,

Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com Dec. 15, 2004, available at
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html
140

See supra Part III; see generally Public Utilities Commission

of the District of Columbia v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)
(holding that the government could continue to permit audio,
consisting of music, talk, and commercials, to be played through
speakers in streetcars and buses).
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government should just provide parents with the opportunities to
shield their children from certain speech if they so choose.141
Other cases seem to suggest that the government may have an
interest, independent that of the parents, in protecting minors.
Beyond the issue of whether the government has an
independent interest in protecting minors, it seems that any
regulation maintaining a total ban based on this interest would
fail to be narrowly tailored.

Again, however, in a nonpublic

forum narrow tailoring is not required, just a reasonable
interest in regulation.142

The Court has struck down other

regulations aimed at protecting minors that were not even total
bans.

In Playboy143 the government was concerned about the impact

of bleed-over from adult channels on children viewers.

The Court

discussed how there were more narrowly tailored options, such as
providing lock boxes that would totally block out the channels to
parents who requested them.144

141

See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803

(2000) (holding that providing households with the opportunity to
request better measures to block unwanted cable channels was
sufficient).
142

See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460

U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
143

United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803

(2000).
144

See id. at 816.
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Determining whether protecting minors constitutionally
supports maintaining a total ban on cell phone Internet usage is
difficult.

The Court tends to closely examine regulations that

foreclose an entire medium.145

Airplanes offering Internet access

could install filtering software similar to that in many public
libraries instead of a total ban.

This solution seems more

reasonably related to the government interest of protecting
minors from access to harmful material than a total ban.146

145

City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (“Although

prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of
content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the
freedom of speech is readily apparent – by eliminating a common
means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.”).
146

Cf. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003)

(holding that the installation of Internet filters removable upon
the request of patrons did not violate the First Amendment).
However, even considering that the cost of such filters would be
minimal - beyond the cost of the other technological requirements
like a special transmitter on the airplane, such as a pico cell the fact that many airlines are filing or have filed for
bankruptcy indicates that they may not voluntarily incur these
extra costs.

See Despina Afentouli, New Heights for In-Flight

Internet, CNN.com, Mar. 31, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TRAVEL/03/31/bt.internet.flight/ (“Many
U.S. airlines are still in a difficult position financially and
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V. The Government Cannot Constitutionally Maintain a Complete Ban
on Cell Phone Use In-Flight

The focus of this analysis has been to determine if the
First Amendment allows the FCC or FAA to maintain the current ban
on in-flight cell phone use if there is no reasonable possibility
of interference with ground communication or on-board navigation
systems.

Total bans absent strong government interests are often

considered unconstitutional.

147

Plus, lifting the ban would have

Delta Airlines is only now considering in-flight Internet - which
would make it the first domestic U.S. airline to do so.”) It is
also important to note that such filtering software would not
block any stored images on a passenger’s cell phone.
147

See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (stating that

the State may not “reduce the adult population . . . to reading
only what is fit for children”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002); United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (“The objective of
shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if
the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive
alternative”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (“The
government interest in protecting children from harmful materials
. . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of
speech addressed to adults”).
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positive effects – increased business productivity and greater
freedom of expression during flight.
support maintaining the ban.

However, many people

Some are concerned that cell phone

use during flight would impinge on the privacy of other
passengers, force unwilling listeners to endure offensive speech,
or subject minors to indecent material.

However, the Court is

often hesitant to infringe on constitutionally protected speech
for incidental benefits.148
Prior jurisprudence addressed such concerns through
application of the captive audience doctrine.

148

This doctrine

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (stating

that the presence of an unwilling listener does not justify
proscribing otherwise constitutionally protected speech if the
speech is easily avoidable by the unwilling listener); see also
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)
(holding unconstitutional a regulation banning all films
containing any nudity on a drive-in theater screen.

One failing

justification by the city was the protection of minors outside
the drive-in who could see the films.

“Speech that is neither

obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable
for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by
the First Amendment are no less applicable when government seeks
to control the flow of information to minors.”).
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balanced the interests of the unwilling listener with the
interests of the speaker.

While the confined nature of an

airplane might seem like a prototypical location for a captive
audience, airplane passengers are not captives.

Both the audio

and visual parts of cell phone Internet use during flight are
easily avoided, which weighs heavily against favoring the
unwilling listener by banning the use of cell phones.

Most cell

phone screens are small and any unwilling viewer can easily avert
their eyes.

It requires little effort for a passenger to avoid a

screen that only measures 2.5 inches wide by 2.71 inches high.149
Also, a regulation that screen filters be installed to limit the
angles at which the screen is visible would quell many concerns
about exposure to unwilling viewers or minors.150

149

Cingular Wireless sells a BlackBerry 7100g, one of the mobile

devices with the largest screen – 240 x 260 pixels (2.5 x 2.71
inches.

Cingular Wireless, Online Store,

http://onlinestorez.cingular.com/cell-phone-service/cellphones/cell-phones.jsp?source=INC230063&_requestid=94064 (enter
zip code when prompt; then scroll down to BlackBerry 7100g) (last
visited Dec. 2, 2005).
150

Privacy filters are commonly available for laptops.

Secure-

It, 3M Privacy Filters, Keep Private Information Private with 3M
Filters, http://www.secure-it.com/products/privacy.htm (follow
“3M Privacy Filter / Privacy Screen” hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 10, 2006).

Privacy filters restrict the visible area to
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While there is little differentiation between audio cell
phone speech and passenger conversations, the Court may uphold a
regulation short of a total ban of in-flight cell phone use –
such as a volume or headphone regulation – as a reasonable
regulation.

Being that an airplane is not a traditional public

forum, the government regulations only have to be reasonable.
However, a total ban of cell phones when other, less drastic,
regulations are available seems less and less reasonable.

those directly in front of the screen and present nothing but a
black screen to those viewing from an angle.
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